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WEST VIRGINIA
LAW REVIEW
Volume 58 June, 1956 Number 4
THE RELATION AND CORRELATION OF FREEDOM
AND SECURITY
HmaIY H. FosTm, JR.*
Introduction
A FEW YEARS AGO, some forty-one eminent philosophers and
scientists were asked to contribute to a symposium on the
meaning of freedom.' As a semanticist might have anticipated, there
was substantial disagreement as to the nature of so equivocal an
abstraction. The classicists insisted that in so far as man was gov-
erned by reason he is free. Russell defined it negatively as absence
of external obstacles. The biologists believed that life itself is liberty,
and the moralists equated liberty with the pursuit of happiness.
2
Einstein believed that freedom of the mind could be found in free-
dom from authority and prejudice, but admitted that no one was
free whose whole concern was with necessities. Dewey pinned his
faith on "voluntary associations" and also referred to "effective free-
dom" as the ability to perform and understand. Whitehead ex-
pressed the notion that when ideas become effective there is freedom
and described a "free society" as one where each trade and activity
had a maximum of autonomy and was self-regulated like a profes-
sion. Several of the contributors felt that the essence of freedom
was choice, and a few identified freedom with satisfaction.
Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh.
FaEmom: ITs MEANrn (1940), edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen.
2 The juxtaposition of these definitions piovoked one essayist, Herbert W.
Schneider, to comment that he underistood from the Declaration of Indepen-
dence, that'life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, were supposed to be
three different things. FRtmov: ITs MEANnG 664.
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The understandable tendency of most of the contributors to
read their personally prized values into the concept of freedom re-
sulted in a series of moving essays which taken together illuminated
the many facades of freedom but when viewed separately left the
reader without a blueprint of the structure itself. This was to be
expected, since the meaning of an abstraction is ultimately to be
found in the concrete experiences from which it is abstracted.
Hence, each essay was restricted by the individual writer's points of
contact with the value of freedom.
The fact that as an abstraction freedom should have so many
referents perhaps does not greatly impair its usefulness as an ab-
straction nor completely dissipate its force as a symbol, but it does
indicate that its function may be more emotionally suggestive than
informative. Indeed, as we look about us today, we may note that
even the most odious totalitarian regimes have proclaimed their
allegiance to the values of freedom and justice, and by a semblance
of logic, albeit sophistry, attempt to convince their subjects that they
are true to these higher values. Protests that this is a desecration or
perversion of the true meaning of such values, although it may allay
justifiable indignation, in the final analysis leads to a somewhat
futile battle over "true" definitions.
Experience indicates that amateurs should shy away from grap-
pling with abstractions. Since the days of Plato, philosophers and
theologians have disputed the meaning of freedom and justice, good
and evil. Perspicacity admonishes us to respect their specialty and
to be content with serving as spectators. The Procustean bed is
theirs to manipulate and as they made it, perhaps they should lie in it.
But even if we forego the metaphysical meanings of freedom,
leaving that problem for the experts, we may be able to make intel-
lectual progress on a somewhat lower level. By adopting the prag-
matic method and inquiring into the manifestations of freedom and
how the law utilizes and furthers it, we may be able to observe
some of its implications and make inferences as to its nature. At the
outset, we perceive that the law is concerned with the interests as-
serted by individuals and groups. Many of these interests are often
referred to as 'liberties" or "rights." They also involve "duties."
These rights, liberties, and duties frequently are asserted in the title
of freedom or in the title of securfty. In legal literature, freedom
seems to have an affirmative and security a negative connotation.
The former is thought of as involving an affirmative expression of
2
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certain interests, the latter as the conservation or stabilization of
certain interests.
If we regard freedom as security from restraint (an authorized
expression of certain liberties) ,3 and security as freedom from inter-
ference (the protection of certain interests, including liberties, by
the imposition of restraints), the relationship betwen the values of
freedom and security becomes apparant. If we go a step farther
and examine how the law recognizes and protects these values, we
see that this is done by conferring rights and imposing duties.
Now one of the significant things about rights and duties is that
the law has come to regard them as correlatives. Analytical jurispru-
dence presumes that these terms are relational, always exist together,
and that A's right necessarily implies B's duty. Perhaps, similarly,
freedom and security may be regarded as relational, as always ex-
isting together, and as being correlatives in the limited sense that
freedom is the name we give to an affirmative expression of certain
liberties and security is the name given to their protection.
Hence, by employing the technique of fragmentation, by split-
ting the atoms of freedom and security into particular liberties, se-
cured by rights, privileges, and duties, we may leave the summit of
philosophical abstraction and descend to the plain of empirical
observation. As abstractions they lack definite contour, but their
components, "liberties", may be particular and culturally identi-
fiable. Our premise is that freedom and security are aggregations
of liberties which the legal order processes in terms of rights and
duties. We will first consider the nature of rights and duties.
Interests, Rights, and Duties
We are indebted to Roscoe Pound for the formulation of his
theory of interests which describes the processes of positive law.
4
In eclectic fashion, Pound assimilated Rudolf Von Jhering's con-
ception of a legal right as a legally protected interest, William
James' conception of a claim or demand as a source of ethical obliga-
3"The first form of civil liberties is security. Montesquieu gives the classic
formulation of this idea (cited by Russell): 'The political liberty of the subject
is a tranquility of mind arising from the opinion each person has of his safety.
In order to have this liberty, it is requisite the government be so constituted as
one man need not be afraid of another.' And, we might add, need not be afraid
of the police .. " Schneider, supra note 2, at 667.
4 POUND, OTLINE OF LEcTuREs ON JURISPRUDENCE 96 (5th ed. 1943). See
also Pound, A Theory of Social Interests, 15 PAPERS AND PROCEE NrGs OF TIM
ANIERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL Socury 16 (1921), reprinted HALL, READINGS IN
JURIsPRUDENCE 238-246 (1938).
3
Foster: The Relation and Correlation of Freedom and Security
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1956
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
tion, and defined individual interests as "claims or demands or de-
sires involved immediately in the individual life and asserted in title
of that life."5 From Pound's sociological point of view, law is con-
ceived of as one means of social control, utilized by politically or-
ganized society as a media for the satisfaction of a maxium of human
wants and desires with a minimum of friction and waste., This
function is performed by recognizing, securing, delimiting, or re-
jecting certain classes of interests (claims or demands), according
to the values of the time and place.7 The values which afford the
standards employed in the delimitation of interests, Pound expressed
in terms of jural postulates.
Elsewhere, Pound has described this process as one of "social
engineering."8 What is the source of these "interests"? Pound con-
cludes that the law does not create them (as the positivists had con-
tended) and concedes that to this extent the venerable theory of
natural rights is correct. Instead, the legal order processes the as-
serted interests. When the claim is recognized it acquires the status
of a right, if it is rejected there is no-right. A right is a legally re-
cognized interest, a claim ordemand which has received the im-
primatur of the positive law.
Moreover, interests may be classified into three major divisions:
individual, public, and social. The interests which Pound classifies
as "individual" include the ones which historically have been called
"natural rights." Within this classification are interests of person-
ality, domestic relations, and interests of substance (property and
contracts). Those interests labeled "public" encompass claims made
by the state as a juristic person and those made as guardian of the
social interest (police power). Synthesis is achieved in the category
of "social" interests because included are not only the interest in
general security (safety, health, peace and order, security of trans-
actions and security of acquisitions), the security of social institu-
tions, the interest in general morals, aesthetics, and progress, but
most important for our analysis, also subsumed under the category
5 PATTEnsoN, JxmisPRuDENcE 520 (1953). Jerome Hall, in a recent article,
points out that while Holmes inspired the major recent tendencies in American
legal philosophy, Pound provided the learned texts, that Pound was greatly
influenced by American sociology, especially by Ross and Ward, and that Pound
adopted the philosophy of pragmatism as articulated by William James. See
Hall, American Tendencies in Legal Philosophy and the Definition of Law, 3
Com'. L. REv. or JAPAN 1 (1956).
6 Pound, Fifty Years of jurisprudence, 51 HAnv. L. rv. 777, 810 (1938).
7 POUND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 96.
8 Pound, supra note 6, at 810.
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of social interests is the social interest in the individual human life
and in free self-assertion (including the propositions that one human
being should not be subjected to the arbitrary will of another, and
the social interest in affording an opportunity for self-realization and
the development of capabilities).
How does the legal order secure these interests? Pound's answer
is that the law secures interests by (1) conferring upon individuals
legal rights or powers, (2) by leaving individuals free (legal privi-
leges or "liberties"), (3) by imposing upon individuals duties which
are correlative to rights, and (4) by imposing liabilities.
Pound is careful to point out that law is but one means of social
control and that religion and custom are also significant control
agencies. Moreover, in describing the juridical function, Pound did
not dismiss the ideal element of law. As previously stated, the ideals
of natural rights are incorporated into the claims of interests which
are asserted by individuals or groups, and in addition Pound form-
ulated five jural postulates which he says men in civilized society
should be able to assume.9 These postulates are generalizations
distilled from the principles expressed in Anglo-American law, run
the gamut of actions and remedies, and are supported by empirical
observation in that they are the fundamental principles underlying
decisions and statutes.10
Although most of Pound's sociological jurisprudence is prag-
matic and descriptive, his formulation of jural postulates and his
recognition of the role that the ideal element in law plays in the
composition of interests and in guiding judicial decision, helps to
bridge the gulf between natural law and analytical jurisprudence
and between morality and law. On the one hand, he takes a func-
tional and pragmatic approach in analyzing legal institutions, and
on the other hand he perceives that the "oughf' element of law is
always with us, in the assertion of demands and in the sense of
justice or injustice which motivates litigant and court alike. The
institutional method is one of reason and compromise in the dispo-
sition of conflicting and competing claims, legal phenomena are
regarded as social phenomena, but what is done juridically, in the
9 POUND, op. cit. supra note 4, at 168, 179, 183-84, reprinted in PATTERSON,
JURISPRUDENCE 516-17.
10 Although Pound himself did not purport to have found the eternal veri-
ties, his friend Hocking lapsed into hyperbole and claimed that Pound's jural
postulates embodied the "absolute values of all time." Pound merely asserted
that his postulates reflected the values he perceived in current decisions. See
PATrEasoN, JurisPRDENCE 517.
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final analysis, is dependent upon the values which are recognized
and applied.
An integral part of the theory of interests is the concept that
law is relational, that rights and duties exist between persons rather
than between persons and things. Although Thomas Hobbes" and
Jeremy Bentham' 2 intimated that there might be utility in casting
aside the abstractions of natural law and concentrating upon the
definition and analysis of legal terms and institutions, John Austin
was the first to undertake a formal and detailed analysis. Abjuring
natural law, Austin concentrated upon positive law and concluded
that ".... every legal right is the creature of positive law: and it
answers a relative duty imposed by that positive law .... To every
legal right, there are therefore three parties: The sovereign govern-
ment.... which sets up the positive law, and which through the
positive law confers the legal right, and imposes the relative duty:
the person or persons on whom the right is conferred: the person or
persons on whom the duty is imposed... ."13 He also concluded,
"all rights reside in persons, and are rights to acts or forbearances
on the part of other persons. And acts and forbearances, consid-
ered from this aspect, I would style the objects of rights, and of the
corresponding duties or obligations . '...14 Finally, in another con-
nection, he argued that "Duty is the basis of right. That is to say,
parties who have rights, or parties who are invested with rights,
have rights to acts or forbearances enjoined by the sovereign upon
other parties."15
In effect, Austin rejected the moral connotation of the word
"right" and defined it to mean a dispensation from the sovereign
which was relative to an onus imposed by such authority. The
sovereign, operating through positive law, by fiat granted rights and
imposed duties with reference to certain acts and forbearances. To
natural law philosophers, of course, this was a grossly esoteric if not
heretical definition of "right" and "duty." Moreover, Austin failed to
11 HOBBES, LEvIATHAN 143-44 (Every-man Library ed. 1914).
1 2
BENTHA.%, THE LnmITs OF JURISPRUDENCE 88 (C. W. Everett ed. 1945).
1 3
AUSTiN, I EcTuREs oN JURmsPRuDENcE 290-91 (3d ed., Campbell 1869),
reprinted HAILL, READINGS IN JuRisPnuDEEc 442, 443 (1938).
14AUSTLN, op. cit. supra note 13, at 377-80; HALL, op. cit. supra note 13,
at 451.
15 Ausn'N, op. cit. supra note 13, at 405-407; HALL, Op. cit. supra note 13,
at 453. As Mr. Justice Holmes has observed: "But the word 'right' is one of
the most deceptive of pitfalls; it is so easy to slip from a qualified meaning in
the premise to an unqualified one in the conclusion. Most rights are qualified."
American Bank and Trust Co. v. Federal Bank, 251 U.S. 350, 358 (1921).
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perceive that it was the assertion of interests (claims and demands)
which stimulated the positive law to action, and his emphasis on
command overlooked the subject matter of the command. Pound
speaks of the "recognition" of interests, rather than "command" of
the sovereign. Finally, Austin argues that duties are anterior to
rights, and hence his emphasis is a negative one, whereas Pound's
theory of interests has an affirmative content in that although rights
and duties (being correlatives) arise simultaneously, rather than the
one out of the other, an interest preceded the declaration and as
such was a potential right, and by the same token a moral obligation
preceded the imposition of duty.16
What difference does it make which analysis is accepted?
Perhaps none, but if we accept the thesis that "duty is the basis of
right" our attention may be focused on past instances of liability
rather than upon the nature of the claim. For example, there are
two competing philosophies as to tort liability.17 What might be
called the English view, typified by Salmond, is that tort law con-
sists of "a number of specific rules prohibiting certain kinds of con-
duct and leaving all the residue outside the sphere of legal respon-
sibility."' 8 This view results in closed categories of tort liability
and a restriction of actionable wrongs to precedent, because the
interest advanced by the plaintiff is secondary to, or its recognition
is conditioned upon, whether or not previous cases have granted
relief under like circumstances. Opposed to this view is one which
concentrates upon the nature of the plaintiffs interest, which ac-
cepts the premise that it is prima facie wrongful to cause harm to
another without just cause or excuse, and that for every wrong there
should be a remedy.' 9 In other words, the interest should be recog-
nized, the right conferred, and the correlative duty imposed, if the
values of the time and place support the claim and if it is admin-
istratively feasible. In the case of new torts, where there is a new
interest striving for recognition, an undue concentration upon duty
-regarding it as the basis of right-may lead to a "hardening of the
categories," whereas a perspective which takes into account com-
16 See Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a Basis of Tort Liability,
56 U. PA. L. REv. 217, 316 (1908), reprinted BOmE, STUDIES IN THE LAW OF
ToRTs 291 (1926). Holmes also reasoned that legal duties were logically
antecedent to legal rights. See THE ComoN LAW 219-220 (1881).
17 See Goodhart, The Foundation of Tortious Liability, 2 MoD. L. REv. 1
(1938).
18SALmoND, LAW OF TORTS (6th ed. 1924), reprinted in COHEN AN
COHEN, READINcS IN JuRISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHmIosoPHY 210, 211 (1953).
1 9 PoLLocK, LAw OF TORTS 21 (9th ed. 1912).
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peting interests will have greater adaptability. Invasion of privacy,
recovery for the infliction of mental suffering, actions for prenatal
injuries, are familiar examples where such an ideological conflict
is apparent.
Today, the definition of right and duty in terms of the legal
relations between persons, is generally accepted as one of Austin's
major contributions to legal analysis. The American Law Insti-
tute's restatements of the law uniformly accept analytical termi-
nology. Although occasionally courts continue to think of property
rights as relations between persons and things, 20 by and large
"right" and "duty" have acquired a fixed meaning. Since Austin
the rudiments of analytical jurisprudence have been brought to
fruition by Hohfeld and the lawyer's vocabulary may include what
is known as "Hobfeld terminology."21
According to Hohfeld and his able interpreter, Professor Cor-
bin,2 2 the legal relations between persons, perceived by Austin,
may be reduced to jural correlatives and jural opposites. Each
pair of correlatives must always exist together, when A has one
of the pair, another person, B, necessarily has the other. One of
terms expresses the relation of A to B, the other expresses the
relation of B to A. No pair of jural opposites can exist together,
i.e., when A has a "right" he cannot have "no-right" with respect to
the same subject matter and the same person, when A has a "privi-
lege," he cannot have a "duty".
2 3
The jural correlatives and the jural opposites which may have
some bearing on this discussion are the bundles of correlatives:
right and duty, privilege and no-right; and the opposites: right and
no-right, privilege and duty.
We may note that duty, although it is the correlative of right,
is the opposite of privilege. That right, although the correlative of
duty, is the opposite of no-right; and that privilege, although the
correlative of no-right, is the opposite of duty; that no-right, although
the correlative of privilege, is the opposite of right. In substance,
then, this means that if A has a right against B, B owes a duty to A,
but that if A has no-right against B, B owes no duty to A; if A has
20 Under the law of eminent domain, it becomes particularly important that
property be viewed as a relation between persons. See Foster, Tort Liability
Under Damage Clauses, 5 0LA. L. Rv. 1, 5 (1952).
21 Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reason-
ing, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913), 26 YALE L.J. 710 (1917).
22 Corbin, Legal Analysis and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919).
23 Id. at 166.
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a privilege against B, B has no-right to oppose A's privilege, but
that if A has no privilege as to B, he owes a duty to B; that if we
look at it from B's point of view, B has a duty he owes to A, if A has
a right, but if A has no privilege against B, A is under a duty to B;
that if B has no-right to oppose A, A has a privilege against B, and
if A has no-right against B, no duty is owed by B.
In his analysis of "privilege," Corbin explains that a privilege
is the "legal relation of A to B when A (with respect to B) is free
or at liberty to conduct himself in a certain manner as he pleases
. . .,,24 As pointed out by Max Radin, such a definition is at odds
with both historical and current usage in that this sort of "privi-
lege" is usually called a "right" and "so clearly are these 'privileges'
rights, that they are usually the first things that are thought of as
rights when the word occurs in speech... . It is, therefore, im-
possible, unless we wish to rewrite a good part of the English lit-
erature, to refuse the term 'right' to these situations .... 25 Radin,
in his analysis, renamed "privilege" as used in this sense and referred
to it as a "privilege-right" as distinguished from a "demand-right"
(Hobfeld's "right"). Another writer, Terry,26 included this type
of privilege as a specie of right which he labeled a "permissive
right," and pointed out that in this situation A has no duty not to
act, there is no restraint on him, and that "liberties" and the "free-
doms" in the Bill of Rights were of this character.
It would seem that not only is there a substantial departure
from the ordinary meaning of "rights" in the Hohfeldian definition of
privilege, but also what is described as privilege is at variance with
the lawyer's meaning of the term. Generally, a privilege is regarded
as an exemption from liability, for what (but for the privilege)
would be a breach of duty, and it is really the occasion, rather
than the individual, which is privileged.27 Perhaps, the permissive
character of privilege (exemption from liability) and the permissive
character of some rights ("liberties") occasioned their joinder under
the term "privilege", but the confusion leads to difficulties. If we
think of some rights as being in the nature of demands A has on B,
and of others as authorizations to A to act or forbear with reference
to B, in each instance there being a correlative duty on B to comply
with the demand or not to oppose A in the exercise of his right,
24 Id. at 167-68.
25 Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HAv. L. REv. 1141, 1149 (1938).
2
6 Terry, Duties, Rights and Wrongs, 10 A.B.A.J. 123 (1924).
27 SeePROSSER, TORTS § 16 (2d ed. 1955).
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then, whether the act or forbearance is to be done or omitted by
either A or B, is immaterial, and both are on a plane equality.2
Accordingly, throughout this discussion, the term "night" may
be taken to comprehend 'liberties" and to include the situation
where A is free or at liberty to conduct himself as he chooses. The
legal consequence is that there is a duty not to interfere with
another's liberty. Since, in any event, what is involved is the recog-
nition of an interest, and since in either case there may be a correl-
ative duty to serve or not to oppose the "dominus", it would seem
that Hobfeld's distinction may be rejected. If we concentrate upon
the conversion of interests into rights and duties we see that in each
instance there is an affirmative vindication of one and a negative
treatment or rejection of the other. In every case, there is an affirma-
tive and a negative, a for and an against, an approbation and a dis-
approval. It follows that where there is a right or a "liberty" there
is a correlative duty.
Freedom and Security as Correlatives
The preceding analysis of the theory of interests and the concept
of jural correlatives and jural opposites, results in the assumption
that rights, privileges, duties and liabilities, arise out of the pro-
cessing of interests, but that interests are the grist for the juridicial
mill and that value judgments, or natural rights, stimulate the asser-
tion of interests by litigants and influence the adjustment of those
interests by the court in the individual case. In other words, values
such as freedom and security, are both grounds for claims and
grounds for decision. If we pinpoint the stage at which adjudication
occurs, we see that legal relations exist only between persons and
that the ubiquitous companion of right is its correlative duty. Upon
the basis of these assumptions let us turn to a consideration of the
problem of whether or not freedom and security are correlatives
or opposites, and thereafter consider them as values.
We have assumed that freedom, in the lawyer's sense of the
term, may be regarded as an aggregation, as the collective name
given to the bundle of liberties recognized in a democratic society.
When we examine the meaning of those things we call "liberties"
we see that they consist of rights and privileges. In the case of
28 The case of Ploof v. Putnam, 81 Vt. 471, 71 Ad. 188 (1908), illustrates
the proposition that the defendant has a duty not to oppose the exercise of a
privilege by the plaintiff, the defendant being held liable for the damage occa-
sioned when his servant unmoored plaintiff's sloop from the defendant's dock
10
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security, there is a connotation of restraint of interference. Re-
straint, to the lawyer, implies duty and obligation. On the one hand,
we see that as duty is the correlative of right, restraint is the correl-
ative of freedom, and on the other hand we see that freedom and
restraint do not exist at the same time in the same person with
reference to the same subject matter. A's freedom entails a restraint
upon B, and a restraint upon B confers freedom on A. Or, to put
it another way, every law restrains some liberty of some, but in
doing so it establishes some liberty for others. Moreover, a rejec-
tion of As interest is a negative recognition of B's interest. Free-
dom does not exist in a vacuum but in the relation between men,
and all liberties depend upon restraints just as all rights depend on
duties.
29
It follows from this that freedom involves the restraint of inter-
ference. One basic problem of law and society is how to bring about
a balance and adjustment between conflicting assertions of freedom
so that from a utilitarian point of view a maximum of freedom is
enjoyed by all, license by none. If a liberty is subtracted from one
person or group, it augments the liberty of another person or group.
The delicate task is to achieve an equilibrium and to avoid an over-
concentration of rights in one group because of the restraint which
is thereby imposed upon other groups. If one group achieves a
monopoly of rights or a superabundance of freedom, necessarily at
the expense of others, the excess becomes power or license. The
dictum of Lord Acton is then applicable.30
where the former in the exercise of his privilege of necessity had tied up during
a storm.
29 See MacIver, The Meaning of Liberty and Its Perversions, FREEDOm: ITS
MEANING 278, 281. "All liberties are at the expense of other liberties ...
that is what is meant by calling them cultural rather than natural. Hence not
all men can have the same liberties; the most they can hope for are 'equal,''equitable,' or 'like' liberties. 'Reciprocal liberties' would be a still better term
to denote the correlative nature of rights and duties... " Schneider, supra note
2, at 670.
"If unity is found in diversity, certainty in doubt, and permanence in
change, what is the common factor that reconciles these anomalies and which
keeps our social order together? Diversity, doubt, and change imply the exist-
ence of freedom to differ, to doubt, and to alter existing conditions. Indeed,
freedom is the essential characteristic of democracy as we understand it. But
freedom without restraint or qualification destroys itself and in so doing destroys
the unity, certainty, and permanence which a politically organized society must
have if it is to endure. To survive, freedom needs a framework within which it
can operate.... The framework of freedom is law... Nutting, The Frame-
work of Freedom, 5 J. LEGAL ED. 131, 133 (1952).
30 "Power corrupts: absolute power corrupts absolutely." As Brandeis,
Gilson, and others point out.. . the aim of law is to make men free of each
other's power." Schneider, supra note 2, at 669.
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From this standpoint the judicial process becomes one of ad-
justment and compromise. Competing and conflicting interests must
be weighed and balanced in the allocation of rights and duties.
Maintaining equilibrium or a balance of power is part of the judicial
function. Diverse interests must be harmonized and reconciled to
the extent that it is possible to do so. Because of their interrelation
and counter effects, rights (and duties) are not viewed as "abso-
lutes." The qualification of rights and duties, what Pound refers to
as "delimitation", becomes a prime job for the judiciary. And it
must be kept in mind that bestowal of a right involves the impo-
sition of a duty, and that a recognition of A's claim to freedom will
occasion restraint upon B. In this respect there is a marked simi-
larity between the judicial and the legislative processes,31
In the area of political controversy, we are sometimes con-
fronted with the argument that every law is an encroachment upon
liberty. Occasionally, such an appeal is addressed to a court or is
expressed in an opinion. Under our analysis such emotional appeals
are at best-or at worst-half-truths. For the "encroachment" upon
A's liberty simultaneously confers liberty upon B, and before the
"encroachment" A's liberty was a restraint as to B.
For example, many employers would insist that they have a
"right" to run their business as they see fit. Their employees, or
their union, may be equally insistent that there is a "right" to or-
ganize and bargain collectively. For many years, the law recognized
and gave protection to the "right" asserted by employers. More
recently, a social re-evaluation has occurred, and now, due to statute,
there is a "right" to organize and bargain collectively, and as a corol-
lary, there is a duty not to interfere with the exercise of such rights.
The statute in question-the Wagner Act-took some freedom away
from employers. But it gave a new freedom to employees.
Similarly, the recognition of the equity of redemption, was an
"encroachment" upon the rights of the mortgagee; the setting of
legal rates of interest was an invasion of the prerogatives of the
money lender; regulation of wages and hours or prices, and out-
lawing "yellow-dog" 6ontracts, infringed upon the rights of employ-
ers; all regulation of public utilities lessens the freedom of such
31 Obviously, most legislation is passed in response to claims, demands, and
desires advanced by citizens and groups, and a committee hearing may be the
counterpart to a judicial processing* of interests. For a comparison of the simi-
larity between these functions of the legislative and judicial processes, see Bel-
lows, In Defense of Lobbying, 172 Hinpxi's MAGAZINE 96 (1935).
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enterprises; and in fact, any duty or obligation imposed by the civil
or criminal law, from the viewpoint of the "servus" is an impair-
ment of liberty. But on the affirmative side, at the same time, liberty
was bestowed upon others.32
-Freedom as a Value
A common definition of freedom is "the state or condition of
being free-not bound by restrictions." Although this definition is
far from adequate because, as we have seen, one peculiar and para-
doxical quality of freedom is that for man to be free there must be
some restraint, and hence the value has a reciprocal or social char-
acter, it is true that freedom often is associated with the ability to
move. The puling babe, the rebellious youngster, the definant ado-
lescent, and the frustrated adult, all resent real or imaginary re-
straints and restrictions, almost instinctively. All living things must
have some ability to move, else they perish. Literal restraint or con-
finement provokes a sense of claustrophobia and we view with hor-
ror the tragic figure of Prometheus and the victim in Poes The Cask
of Amontillado. Dante's Inferno reaches the ultimate in its portrayal
of divers types of restraints and confinements.
But, when we reduce freedom to its component liberties (rights
and privileges), individual assertions of freedom become qualified
by the overriding demands of society and other individuals. A basic
problem of the social control we call law is to bring about a balance
and adjustment between various interests so that from a utilitarian
point of view a maximum of freedom is enjoyed by all, license by
none. An assertion of freedom may be limited at the point where
it conflicts with significant freedoms of others or its exercise would
occasion imminent peril to the social order.
Different content is read into the fundamental values of free-
dom and security, emphasis varies, during the course of social evo-
lution. From the standpoint of law, this is because the interrelation
between the recipients of rights and duties is subject to modifica-
tion, mutation, and change when there is a shift in the current of
popular demand. Freedom and security remain constant as social
values but their particularization into rights, privileges, duties and
obligations, changes with the times. This, I take it, is what is meant
32 See CArn, TiE SENSE OF INJUsTICE 54 (1949); Haldane, A Campara-
tice Study of Freedom, FRmmom: ITs MrENNG 447, 451.
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by the statement that it is the function of law to reflect the values
of the time and place.33
During the course of the social and political history of Western
civilization, there has been a consistent devotion to the ideal of free-
dom. It is the content of freedom, or its particularization into rights
and privileges, which has changed from time to time. Freedom,
justice, beauty, truth, good, are with us always, but they exist as
ideals or abstractions, having concrete reality only when manifested
as attributes or qualities of particular things. In this sense "free-
dom" is the quality common to all free things. This means, more-
over, that for most of us the relevant question becomes, "freedom
for whom and for what?"
For centuries both philosophers and law men grappled with
the concept of natural law. Demosthenes believed that man dis-
covered law, which was the gift of the gods.34 Aristotle distin-
guished between natural law, "that which everywhere has the same
force and does not exist by people's thinking this or that," and posi-
tive law, or "that which is originally indifferent."35 The Stoics viewed
Jus Naturale as the way of happiness for all men, and believed
nature and reason were one.36 Cicero in his De Legibus, identified
"right reason" with those qualities of human nature whereby "man
is associated with the gods," and concluded that positive law was
obligatory only if it was in harmony with the universal attributes
of human nature, and if it was at variance with "true law" it lost
its right to be considered law at all.37 During the Middle Ages, on
the continent and in England, repeatedly claims in terms of natural
rights were made against those in authority. The great philosopher
and theologian, Saint Thomas Aquinas, in Italy, and Englishmen
such as John of Salisbury, Henry of Bracton, Sir John Fortescue, and
Sir Edward Coke, all contributed to the distinctive political doctrine
that political authority is intrinsically limited and that temporal
power was subject to a "higher law." It was assumed that certain
eternal principles of right and justice, of divine origin, were valid
for all times and all places, were obligatory for all men, and were
33 This concept is traceable to Rudolf Von Jhering. See JEmRiNG, TE LAw
AS A MEANs TO AN END (Husik trans. 1914).
34 Quoted in HOLLND, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE at 44n. (12th ed.
1916).
35 7 AmSTOTLE, NicomsHE-A Ermcs (Ross trans. 1925).
3 6 CoRwN, "THE Hscix-a LAw" BACKGROUND or AmmucAN CONSTu-
TroNAL LAw 9 (Great Seal Books ed. 1955).
37 Id. at 10-11.
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discoverable by reason or might be made known through divine
revelation.
Of course, it made considerable difference who had the function
of "discovering" this "higher law." It is a matter of utmost impor-
tance for our culture that while on the continent the discernment of
natural law and its content was a matter for philosophers and theo-
logians, in England from the fourteenth century on the "right rea-
son" of natural law came to mean judicial right reason. The test of
"reasonableness" employed by the common law judges was a test
derived from custom, stare decisis, logic and common sense. Natural
law, in the hands of the legal profession, became a matter of induc-
tive logic, reasoning from concrete cases, rather than deduction from
abstract principles. Thus, the common law came to focus its atten-
tion on liberties (rights and duties) while the civil law remained
absorbed with freedom as an abstraction. The contrast between
common law and European codes as well as that between law and
equity reflects these opposing perspectives.
Throughout the history of the common law, therefore, the story
of freedom has been told by the emergence and recognition of par-
ticular liberties. Magna Carta, the Petition of Right, the Declara-
tion of Independence, and the Bill of Rights, enumerated particular
grievances as well as general principles. In the case of Magna Carta,
it was ofily after the particular liberties had been recognized for the
barons that the generalization occurred and it became a charter of
"common liberties."
By concentrating upon the particular, the problem of "freedom
for what and for whom", the common law has managed to add to
its bundle of liberties as we prosper and progress. Moreover, due
to our habit of reasoning from the particular to the general, rather
than from the abstract to the concrete, most of us find it easier and
more meaningful to point to instances we regard as deprivations
of liberty than to attempt a definition of freedom itself. In his
provocative book, The Sense of Injustice, Edmond Cahn employs
this technique in that he abandons a frontal assault upon the mean-
ing of justice and instead concentrates on the sense of injustice
which he claims is clearly and frequently manifested and is a
familiar and observable phenomenon.39 So too, in the case of free-
dom, that which is subject to empirical observation is its manifes-
tations in terms of rights and duties.
38 Id at 26.
39 At 12-13.
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Our sense of freedom-or, to state it negatively, our sense of
deprivation of liberty-is thus tied to what is done in the specific
instance. As a matter of fact, when this is forgotten, and courts fly
in the stratosphere of higher law too long, contact with reality is
lost. Thus when freedom of contract becomes an idee fixe, the
concrete liberty of employees may be sacrificed to the abstract free-
dom of contract of employer and employee deduced from eternal
and immutable natural law. The beneficiaries of social legislation,
whose spokesmen lobbied for the legislation, must be saved from
the enslavement they naively procured under a spurious claim of
freedom; the right of children to labor and women to toil long
hours,40 must override the economic facts of life. From the rarified
atmosphere of natural law, the real world seems remote and ob-
scure.41 On the other hand, when we utilize the pragmatic method
of looking at the consequences rather than at abstractions, compare
alternatives, and consider possible results, the evaluation may be
guided by empirical observation rather than amorphous ideals which
so often have proved chimerical and have meant all things to all
men.
It follows that we have a sentimental attachment to the value
of freedom, it is an emotive term, a winning slogan, but it has sub-
stantial meaning and definite content only when we split it into
component liberties that we know as rights and privileges.
Security as a Value
Security, it has been said, is the state or condition of being
secure-free from danger or risk. We have seen that, paradoxically,
freedom implies restraint. To be free there must be some restraint
and perhaps restraint of restraint. In the case of security, in a demo-
cratic order, there must be freedom or the consequence is inse-
curity. Neither can exist without the other; even as values they
complement and qualify one another.
We have noted that the drive for freedom is a basic one, com-
mon to all living things. Sometimes the value of security is spoken
of as the "law of self-preservation." It too is basic. Modem psy-
chology has stressed the need for a sense of security and has at-
40See the opinion by Mr. Justice Sutherland in Adkins v. Children's Hos-
pital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
41 See dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes in the Adkins case, where he observes:
"It will need more than the Nineteenth Amendment to convince me that there
are no differences between men and women. .. ."
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tributed many of our woes to the so-called sense of insecurity.42
Judge Jerome Frank has even tried to use Freudian psychiatry to
explain our approach to law.43 But security, as a value, invites the
inquiry, "security for whom, security of what?' The concept be-
comes meaningful to most of us only when we reduce it to terms
of human experience.
How does the legal order promote the value of security? Pri-
marily, it does so by imposing duties and obligations, or what we
have called restraints. The security of transactions is effected by
imposing the obligation to perform promises or its substitute, a
secondary duty to pay damages. Security of the person is main-
tained by the imposition of statutory and common law duties, both
civil and criminal, the breach of which gives rise to damages or
penalty. The use and enjoyment of property is secured through
the duties imposed by the law of trespass and case. The "Thou
shalt nots" and the interdictions of the law are restraints upon what
might otherwise be regarded as freedom of action.
But, as we have seen, duty is the correlative of right. The
restraints imposed by law upon one, protect the liberty of another.
So when we ask the pragmatic question, "secufity for whom, security
for what?" we are demanding a specification of the reasons which
justify restraint or duty in the concrete situation. Here, it is inter-
esting to note, the common law has always been more willing to
proscribe certain kinds of conduct or action than it has been to im-
pose a duty of aifrimative action.44 Ordinarily, one is not required
to bestow an affirmative advantage or benefit unless there is some
prior relationship from which to imply an undertaking to do so.45
The normal duty is to desist, not to interfere, intermeddle, or in-
flict harm. Whether the distinction arises out of causality, inaction
being regarded as more remote than misfeasance, a respect for
inertia, or the rationalization that at least nonfeasance made the
situation no worse, there has been a marked tendency within recent
years to whittle away at the distinction and to find a basis in some
relationship upon which to predicate a duty,46 and it has been pre-
42 For a popular treatment of the social significance of a sense of insecurity,
see Ovasmrr, THE MATuRE Mnm (1949).
43 FANK, LAw AND THE MODEw Mn (1936).
44 See Bohlen, The Basis of Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Tort, 53
U. PA. L. Rxv. 209, 237, 337 (1905), reprinted BOHLEN, STuorEs uN THE LAW
OF TORTS 33 (1926).
45 Ibid.
46 PRossER, ToRTs § 38 (2d ed. 1955).
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dicted that in time the distinction may be discarded as obsolete.47
Obviously, jurisprudentially speaking, what is happening in this
area of tort law is that the defendant's interest in freedom of inaction
is yielding to the plaintiff's interests of personality and a social
interest in the individual life. Eventually, if administratively fea-
sible, the rule may emerge that there is an affirmative duty to aid
others when there is a moral obligation to do so, because courts
will consider that the social interest in relieving distress is more
important than individualistic insouciance.
4s
In the imposition of duties, the common law has been circum-
spect and cautious. Although the law of trespass and nuisance has
given prime emphasis to the security of property owners, sometimes
at the expense of other individual interests,49 there has been only
a qualified concern over interests of personality as distinguished
from substance. Heaven v. Fender,5" although it states a general
principle underlying moral obligations, has not yet been fully ac-
cepted, and in the case of foreseeable economic harm, more than
mere negligence may be a prerequisite for duty.5' Moreover, the
mystic doctrine of proximate cause, as well as the defenses of con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk, privilege and immunity,
may preclude the imposition of duty or make a breach non-action-
able. These matters, together with the normal rule which places
the burden of proof on the plaintiff, restrict, limit, and qualify the
recognition of the claimed rights and interests of personality.
The law of torts is the example par excellence of the judicial
4 7 CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 2.5 (1928).
48 See 1 BENnur's WoRKs 164 (1859), where he argues: "In particular,
in cases where the person is in danger, why should it not be made the duty
of every man to save another from mischief, when it can be done without prej-
udicing himself.. . " Benthamn's American disciple, Livingston, in his Draft
Code, held it was criminal homicide to omit saving a person's life if that could
be done "without personal danger or pecuniary loss." See HALL, PRMnCIPLES OF
CammAL LAw 250-52 (1947).
49 For example, see Bohlen, The Duty of a Landotmer, 69 U. PA. L. REv.
142, 237, 340 (1921), reprinted in BoHaL_, Srunms iN E LAw OF ToRTs
156 (1926).
50 11 Q.B.D. 503 (1883), opinion by Brett, M.R. (Lord Esher) who stated
the general proposition that "whenever one person is by circumstances placed
in such a position with regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense who
did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and
skill in his own conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause
danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use
ordinary care and skill to avoid such danger.
51 For example, see Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E.
441, 74 A.L.R. 1139 (1931).
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process of securing and delimiting interests. The process is one of
continual weighing and balancing, adjustment and compromise. The
dominant social values of the time and place, albeit belatedly, occa-
sion reevaluation and reappraisal, and leaven the administration of
law. Moreover, to a lesser extent, the law of contracts shows the
same change and shift in emphasis in weighing other interests with
the interest of having promises performed, as is shown by the growth
of the law of warranty, 52 the dilution of caveat emptor,53 the devel-
opment of the law relative to fraud and mistake,54 and the expansion
of notions of public policy.55 Even the law of trespass has not re-
mained impervious to the increment occasioned by the assertion
of other interests.50
Security, then, whether it be of person, property, or transactions,
is recognized and given effect as an important individual interest
of personality and of substance, and, further, it is assumed that
there is a social interest in general security as well as in the indi-
vidual human life, but in its imposition of duties and conference
of rights, the law recognizes that there are other interests which are
entitled to evaluation if not recognition. One of the interesting and
significant developments of our times is the gradual descendancy
of interests of substance from their preferred position in the heir-
archy of individual interests and the tendency to regard them as
being on the same plain as interests of personality. When this is
done in a given case, it does not mean that security as a value has
been discarded or ignored, for security of the person, whether it
be an interest in integrity of the body or life, personal liberty, or
honor and reputation, is just as much entitled to the name of "se-
curity" as are interests of substance. So when we reiterate our ques-
tion, "Security for whom, security of what?" we may find that we
52 See Bohlen, Misrepresentation as Deceit, Negligence or Warranty, 42
HARV. L. REv. 733 (1929); Carpenter, Responsibility for Intentional, Negligent
and Innocent Misrepresentation, 24 ILL. L. REV. 749 (1930).
53 Compare Chandelor v. Lopus, 4 Cro. Jac. (1906), with the implied war-
ranties imposed by the UNIFORM: SALES ACT §§ 15(1) and (2), and the new
UNIFORM Coi acmcr.A CODE §§ 2-314, 315.
54 See Keeton, The Ambit of a Fraudulent Represento's Responsibility,
17 TEx. L. REV. 1 (1938).
55 See II ELY, PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEm RELATIONS TO THE Dis-
TRtBuTiON OF WEALTH (1914), reprinted in part, COHEN AND COHEN, READINGS
IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PmmosopRY 175 (1953).
56 REsTATEmENT, TORTS §§ 166, 822 (1938), predicate liability on the
basis of intentional or negligent conduct or extra-hazardous activity. This re-
striction of liability is commented upon in Foster and Keeton, Liability Without
Fault, 3 OELA. L. REv. 1 (1950).
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are faced with a choice between competing interests, each of which
partakes of this value, that security as an abstraction offers us little
help, and that, as in the case of the value of freedom, we had best
focus our attention on the possible consequences of our action rather
than upon so illusive an ideal.
Synthesis
By taking a functional approach to the legal order and by
concentrating on the recognition and delimitation of interests,
the interrelation and interdependence of rights and duties be-
comes manifest. It is hoped that this is not grubbing in the ground
to observe the movement of the stars.57 By focusing attention upon
observable phenomena it may be that there is a sounder basis for
postulating some conceptions as to the natue of freedom and
security. The premise asserted in that freedom and security are
relational rather than opposites, and that we should employ a prag-
matic method in order to ascertain the content of these values.
No doubt it may be objected that historically freedom and
security have often been taken for opposites and at times have been
regarded as incompatible. Generalizations have been made to the
effect that an overemphasis of security and the restriction of free-
dom of action are indicia of a primitive society and that civilization
is characterized by its recognition of freedom as a superior value rM
But when we pause to look at the applications of these values we
see that in order to be free, men must be relatively secure, and in
order to be secure there must be a measure of freedom. Freedom
5' The reference is to the students of the observatory in Aristophanes play
who diligently grubbed in the ground to ascertain the movement of the stars.
58 In HoEBEL, TBE LAw oF P Mrr v MAN 4-5 (1954), an anthropologist
who has acquired a considerable knowledge of law, accepts Hohfeldian ter-
minology and examines the legal order of several cultures. He concludes that
... anthropologically considered, law is merely one aspect of our culture-
the aspect which employs the force of organized society to regulate individual
and group conduct and to prevent, redress or punish deviations from prescribed
social norms.' When this area of behavior we speak of as law is found in the
culture of a preliterate people, we call it primitive law. When it is found
within the culture of ancient societies that had in their time only recently
entered the threshold of civilization, we call it archaic law. And when we find
it in the structure of developed civilizations, we call it modem." Hoebel dem-
onstrates that although individual postulates vary from culture to culture, they
are referable to the values of freedom and security and that it is the manner
of implementing these values which varies. See also, Mueller, Tort, Crime and
the Primitive, 46 J. Clu. L., C. & P.S. 303, 307 (1955), where the learned
author concludes that either the 20th century lav of wrongs is primitive, or
the primitive law of wrongs is quite modern.
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and security do not exclude nor oppose each other. Liberties are
recognized either affirmatively when rights are conferred or nega-
tively when duties are imposed. Security is achieved affirmatively
by the imposition of restraints, or negatively by the withholding of
rights. Hence the value of security is recognized also by this pro-
cess of conferring rights and imposing duties. The security of free-
dom depends upon what is done in the processing of interests, and
the stability of social institutions (often thought of solely in terms
of general security) may likewise depend upon the extent to which
interests asserted in the name of freedom are recognized and given
effect. The real competition in the legal process is not between the
values of freedom and security but between conflicting interests
which in varying degrees always reflect both of these values. Se-
curity includes not only the stability of social institutions but also
the durability of those interests we call liberties. Freedom compre-
hends not only the preservation of our liberties but also the main-
tenance of social order.
The real conflict occurs at the stage of adjudication when com-
peting interests vie for recognition. Since one man's freedom is
another man's restraint, and one man's security may occasion in-
security in his brother, a choice must be made between conflicting
claims which are asserted in the name of both freedom and security.
It becomes apparent that if we are to avoid a dilemma, or to have
anything but a Hobsons choice, we must seek some answer to the
questions "freedom for whom, freedom for what?" and "security
for whom, security for what?"
Have we any standards to guide us in choosing between com-
peting interests which claim the same values? The answer would
seem to be quite obviously the common law, our constitutions,
and abstract notions of justice, are the sources to which we may
refer for guidance. For example, the express recognition of certain
liberties in our Bill of Rights may give a preferred position to them
when they come into conflict with other interests. In the hierarchy
of interests, freedom of expression may therefore be entitled to
greater emphasis.
Not only is there a constitutional preference for certain liber-
ties, but the common law itself nurtured the idea that there is a
public interest or duty to protect and safeguard individual liberties.
When King Alfred with the assistance of his wise men collected the
best out of local laws and customs and made them common by
extending them to the whole nation, the stage was set for the "right
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reason" which was the basis of the common law.59 Within a quarter
of a century after Magna Carta, chapter twenty-nine was taken to
extend to the populace, and under Edward 1, the judiciary was
ordered to treat the Great Charter as "common law."60 In Dr. Bon-
hais Case,61 Sir Edward Coke successfully contended that if an
act of Parliament "is against common right and reason, or repug-
nant, or impossible to be performed, the common law will control
it and adjudge such an act to be void." Contemporaneously, "Free-
born John" Lilburne asserted the "Liberties of Englishmen," -02 and
later, in the trial of William Penn and William Mead,0 3 the de-
fendants claimed that it was a principle of English law "that no
man is bound to accuse himself." Thus, in the formative years of
American political institutions and philosophy, it was assumed that
the principle of "common law and reason" was a higher law which
might be asserted against the government itself.
4
It has been observed that many of the rights which the Consti-
tution of the United States protects at this moment against legis-
lative power were first protected by the common law against one's
neighbors.65 In other words, the recognition of so-called public
rights, to some extent, depends on the prior recognition of private
rights. Throughout this discussion our attention has been directed
towards individual interests. But we have also seen that Pound's
59 ConwLz, TAE "HIcnEl LAw" BACKGROUND OF AMERCAN CoNsTiTu-
TIONAL LAw 24 (Great Seal Books 1955).
6o Id. at 83.
618 Co. 107a (1610), 2 Brownl. 225 (1610), discussed by CoRwiN, op.
cit. supra note 59, at 44. It was held that the London College of Physicians
was not entitled, under the act of Parliament which it invoked in justification,
to punish Dr. Bonham for practicing medicine without a license.
02 See GraB, JOHN LmBauNE (1947), and Wolfram, John Lilburne: De-
mocracy's Pillar of Fire, 3 SYRAcusE L. BEv. 213 (1952). "Freeborn John", who
usually has been given but a footnote in history in connection with the Level-
ler's Movement, for forty years during the first half of the seventeenth century,
fought fabulous legal battles with the Stuarts, Cromwell, and Parliament, in
order to vindicate the rights of Englishmen. Most of the procedural safeguards
we today associate with due process were claimed as "rights" by Lilburne and
many modern political reforms were anticipated by him.
636 How. St. Tr. 951 (1670). They were tried for conspiracy to disturb
the peace because they had held a public meeting in the street outside their
padlocked meeting house. In effect a plea against self-incrimination was in-
voked, and they were acquitted by the jury. An enraged court fined the jurors
and the jurors were imprisoned when their fines were not paid. One juror,
Bushel, brought habeas corpus, and the decision in his case (1670) abolished
the prior practice of fining or imprisoning jurors who brought in verdicts contrary
to the instructions of the court.
64 CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 59, at 72.
65 Id. at 24.
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theory of interests in addition to individual interests contains classi-
fications of "social" interests and "public" interests. It is here that
synthesis occurs. For interests termed "social" include an interest
in the individual as well as an interest in the general "security."
Moreover, public interests include those claims made by the state
as guardian of social interests (including individual interests) which
are usually asserted under the police power of the state. It is within
this framework and context that problems arise as to civil liberties
and civil rights.
Not infrequently, the judicial process is faced with the task of
reconciling an apparent conflict between the security of social insti-
tutions and an interest in free self-assertion. If we view both of
these interests as significant social interests and matters of public
concern, and keep in mind that the common law and our Constitu-
tion so regard them, then the claimed liberty may get at least an
even break in the comparison. But if, on the other hand, the stability
of social institutions is looked upon as a public interest and the
claimed liberty as the interest of a mere individual, the issue has
been foreclosed.6 One of the legacies of the common law is that
individual liberties are social and public in character, that they may
be asserted against the state itself, and that before their abridgement
is warranted, it must be foreseeable that more public harm would
come from their vindication than from their deprivation.
This is a most troublesome problem for the courts. There is little
to guide them to concrete solutions other than the method of accord-
ing to those liberties which have been recognized by the common
law and our constitutions a prima facie preferred status and looking
painstakingly at the probable consequences of the decision. The
"clear and present danger test" of Holmes67 and the "gravity of the
evil, as discounted by its improbability" concept of Learned Hand,68
6 6 See for example the opinion by Judge Prettyman in Barsky v. United
States, 83 App. D.C. 127, 167 F.2d 241 (1948), where he says, ". . . the
problem is the relative necessity of the public interest as against the private
rights.. .", and forecloses further analysis due to the way he puts the question.
See also the examples cited in Cook, The Utility of Jurisprudence in the Solution
of Legal Problems, LE:CTuREs oN LEcAL Topics, 1923-1924 (1928), reprinted
HALL, RFADINcS IN JuiuspRuDENCE 484.
67 This doctrine was first enunciated in Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S.
47 (1919), was reiterated in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), and
finally became accepted by a majority of the court in Herndon v. Lowry, 301
U.S. 342 (1937), after Charles Evans Hughes became Chief Justice.
68 United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950), aft'd, 341
U.S. 494 (1951). For different estimates as to whether or not the Dennis case
overrules the "clear and present danger" test, see HooK, HERnsY, Ys-CoN-
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are attempts to articulate standards for judgment rather than to
formulate rules of thumb. Both Holmes and Hand accord civil
rights a preferred position in the market of interests, but each recog-
nizes that there are some qualifications and limitations. What other
interests are there which may thus override the individual-social-
public interest (liberty) which is guaranteed by common law and
constitution? It would seem that there are at least two implied
limitations which qualify even those liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution. First, a serious and imminent threat to public safety
or the processes of government warrants the restraint of even con-
stitutional liberties. Here, the question is one of "proximity and
degree" according to Holmes, and of "gravity of the evil" according
to Hand, the former emphasizing the time element, and the latter
the magnitude of the harm. It is agreed that there must be a direct
as distinguished from a remote threat of substantive evil, but they
differ as to where the line should be drawn. The second limitation
is also a matter of preservation. 0 A constitutional liberty may be
curbed at the point where its assertion would occasion the destruc-
tion or substantial impairment of some other interest which is
deemed worthy of survival. For example, free speech is limited
by the law of sedition because of the real or apparent danger to
social institutions,"0 and the law of defamation and that pertaining
to obscenity restrict free speech by giving a qualified protection to
the interest in one's good name7' and the interest of public moral-
spntcY, No. c. 5 (1954), and PnrrcaE-r, Civir LmEiS AND '71Th1 VINSON
CourT 72 (1954).
69 From the standpoint of conservation, the assertion of any one lib-
erty should be checked at the point where its exercise (abuse) would occasion
the complete abnegation of some other liberty. We would all agree, to use
Holmes' example, that free speech does not justify shouting "fire" in a crowded
theatre; that one's interest in free movement does not excuse the deliberate
spreading of contagion; that freedom of religion does not warrant invasion
.of a synagogue by a protestant in order to deliver an anti-semitic tirade; and
that even a state of war would not justify the complete abridgement of criticism
of the government.
70 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
71Peck v. Chicago Tribune, 214 U.S. 185 (1909) (liability for defama-
tion); Gompers v. Buck's Stove and Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911) (liability
for "unfair to organized labor" blacklisting); Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson,
283 U.S. 697 (1931) ("free press" guaranty precludes prior restraint); Gros-
jean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) ("free press" guaranty invali-
dated special tax on newspaper); Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1906)
(newspaper criticism of court held contempt); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918) (newspaper criticism as contempt); Craig v. Har-
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ity2 2 But in normal competition with such other interests, free
speech fares the better.7 3 Such liberties, in other words, may be
qualified by the imperatives of general security, but not by its
expedients.
Since the inception of the "cold war," there have been indica-
tions of a retreat from the Holmesian evaluation of civil rights.
Holmes, in effect, presumed the unconstitutionality of legislation
which he believed entailed an abridgement of the rights guaran-
teed by the first and fourteenth amendments, but if no such rights
were involved, under his concept of balance of power and division
of labor, he otherwise presumed the constitutionality of legislation.
74
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in particular, has tended to abandon the
distinction between civil rights and other cases, and to indulge in
a blanket presumption of the constitutionality of all legislation.
75
The result is to demote civil rights from their preferred status or
to accord an equal weight to legislative judgment as to constitu-
tional specifications. Whether this is viewed as a set-back in the
long struggle for judicial protection from governmental oppression
or a commendable example of judicial humility, may depend upon
one's estimates of the legislative branch and the proper ambit of
judicial review, but hindsight shows us the illusory character of
many of the perils which legislatures or courts mistakenly believed
justified the curtailment of liberty.7 6
ney, 331 U.S. 3867 (1947) (contempt); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941) (contempt); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 (1949) (contempt).
7 2 Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (movie censorship); Hannegan
v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946) (mailing privilege).
7 3 Among recent cases which involve a delicate balancing of interests are:
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) ("fighting words"); Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951) (impeding traffic and imminent riot); Beau-
harnais v. Illinois, 843 U.S. 252 (1949) ("group libel' law); Terminello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) (inciting to riot).
74 See Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Constitution, 41 HAIv. L.
REv. 121 (1929), and compare his toleration of legislative experimentation in
economic and social matters in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and
Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), with his "clear and present
danger" test in "free speech" cases.
75 See Mr. Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in the Dennis case, 341
U.S. 494, 517.
76 Professor Helen Merrill Lynd has observed: "We find it easy to tolerate,
even to welcome, the heresy of another time and place, but our own heretics
we say are different. We marvel at the suppression of John Huss; we deplore
the exiling of Roger Williams; we are eloquent in the denunciation of the perse-
cution of Galileo or Socrates, but our own' heretics, the so-called corrupters of
our children, are really dangerous and our only recourse is to have them drink
the hemlock. They do not conform to our traditional pattern of what heretics
should be or, as we frequently put it; they do not fall within the pattern of
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In addition to the common law and our constitutions, the
hierarchy of our freedoms (interests and rights) is affected by those
intangibles which enter into our sense of justice (or injustice). It
would be unrealistic to imagine that the method of pragmatism
affords a complete explanation of the judicial process. The ultimate
basis of choice between conflicting interests may be non-rational
or determined by value judgments. What freedoms, and whose
freedoms, come first, and have priority depends in no small measure
upon faith, as does its corrolary, what security and security for
whom. The democratic faith we profess is that the security of our
freedoms (liberties) is the most important security as long as it
does not become a matter of survival. So too, the restraint we most
welcome is the restraint of restraint for it is by that method that
the judicial process protects our freedoms and secures us from
oppression. Our democratic philosophy today is constructed around
the social nature of man, the interest of society in the individual and
the individual in society. Those claims which once were made in
terms of individual rights are now seen in their social aspect. Free
speech as a liberty is not grounded solely on the private interest
of the utterer, it is also asserted as a social interest because of
society's concern for its constituents and also because society has
an interest in hearing the speech.77 It is part of our faith that we
are willing to wager that in the long run freedom of expression
results in more social good than harm, and that general security
is promoted rather than menaced by allowing a relatively free
expression of ideas.
At the same time, however, we also recognize that the essence
of democracy is compromise, that no so-called rights are absolute,
and that there must be a give and take in the securing of interests.
Living in a relatively insecure world, we realize that complete safety
our traditional political parties." Heywood Broun once said: "Free speech is
about as good a cause as the world has ever known. But like the poor, it is
always with us and gets shoved aside in favor of things which seem at a given
moment more vital. They never are more vital. Not when you look at them
from a distance. When the necessity of free speech is the most important we
shut it off. Everybody favors free speech in the slack moments when no axes
are being ground."
77 "... the peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that
it is robbing the human race: posterity as well as the existing generation; those
who dissent from the opinion still more than those who hold it. If the opinion
is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of exchanging error for truth;
if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit, the clearer perception and
livelier impression of truth produced by its own collision with error...." JoHN
STUART MILL, ON LmERTY 23 (Atlantic Library ed. 1923).
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for ourselves or for our order is impossible of attainment; living in
a crowded society, we see that complete freedom of action is an
impossibility. In our dedication to the value of freedom we have
sometimes thought that security was but a means to the end of free-
dom, but upon reflection, we see both of these related values must
co-exist or wither and die together.
Although we have been preoccupied with a description of the
legal order and an analysis of legal concepts, we have not meant
to imply that religion, philosophy, and custom have nothing to do
with the values of freedom and security. On the contrary, as values
they have ethical and moral content. An abuse of freedom, its
conversion into power, may be a gross immorality.' Undue concern
for security may be a denial of Christian charity. Moreover, self-
restraint is a moral responsibility placed by ethics upon those who
would assert their rights as free men.78 Finally, in our concern over
the institutionalization of freedom and security, we must not forget
that their preservation and perpetuation, in the final analysis,
depends upon our capacity to love liberty as well as life itself, and
that perhaps "even more than love of liberty, we need a love of toler-
ance,"79 which may be regarded as respect for the liberty of others.
7s See essay by Henri Bergson on Freedom and Obligation, in FRannom:
ITS MEANING 612. WALTER Ln'i'mAN, in his TAE PUBLIC PHMosoprr (1955),
advances the thesis that there has been too great an emphasis upon "rights"
rather than "duty" and that our civilization needs a reemphasis of the meaning
of obligation and self-restraint.
79 Schneider, The Liberties of Man, Fausmom: ITs MEANmNG 671.
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